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Recollection Is Impaired by the Modification of Interpretation Bias
Paula T. Hertel, Elaina Vasquez, Amanda Benbow, and Megan Hughes
Trinity University
The interpretation paradigm of cognitive-bias modification (CBM-I) was modified with instructions used
in process-dissociation procedures for the purpose of investigating processes contributing to performance
on the transfer task. In Experiment 1, nonanxious students were trained to interpret ambiguous situations
in either a negative or benign way (or they read nonambiguous scenarios). They were then asked to
respond to new ambiguous situations, in the same way as contextually similar analogues during training,
or to respond differently. Benign training proactively impaired memory for negative outcomes. This
effect was replicated by anxious students in Experiment 2 and discussed with respect to the assumptions
underlying process-dissociation procedures and directions for future research.
Keywords: anxiety, cognitive bias modification, interpretation, memory
Since the beginning of the century, clinical researchers have
been experimentally simulating interpretive biases that character-
ize cognition in mood-disordered states. Negative interpretive bi-
ases are revealed when events with ambiguous meaning—a frown,
a laugh, a noise, a remark—are understood as emotionally nega-
tive, and anxious people, in particular, have demonstrated such
bias (see Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod,
2005). Efforts to simulate interpretation bias in nondisordered
participants have been motivated by the desire to understand
whether negative ways of perceiving and thinking play a causal
role in the development of mood disorders instead of merely being
produced by them.
The paradigm used to simulate interpretation biases is called the
interpretation version of cognitive bias modification (CBM-I); it
begins with many trials designed to lead participants to respond in
a consistently benign or negative way, proceeds with an ambigu-
ous transfer task to allow the free expression of the trained bias,
and sometimes concludes with a measure of participants’ emo-
tional state. Among the different versions of the paradigm is a
frequently used procedure invented by Mathews and Mackintosh
(2000) in which a large number of short verbal scenarios used
during training (e.g., 100) are ambiguous until their very last word;
participants are led to end each scenario with a benign or negative
resolution, depending on their experimental condition, by complet-
ing a word fragment. The transfer task consists of new scenarios
that remain ambiguous; typically, participants reveal their inter-
pretation by rating the similarity of new valenced sentences to the
meaning of each transfer scenario. Reports of CBM-I experiments
often imply that the training phase at least temporarily establishes
a new habit—one much like the habits that characterize anxiety-
disordered cognition. The motivation for the experiments we re-
port is the realization that another consequence of training is also
possible. Performance on a transfer task can be guided by recol-
lection of prior training as well as by habit. More generally, we
intended these experiments as a first step in investigating the
procedural bases of transfer and, thereby, as an important next step
in understanding the contribution of interpretation biases to emo-
tional disorders. Knowing about the underlying processes that give
rise to CBM-I effects will permit a fuller integration of these
findings with cognitive theories of emotional disorders (see MacLeod,
Koster, & Fox, 2009).
CBM-I experiments find their place in a long tradition of ex-
periments on transfer of learning (see Ellis, 1965). Transfer ex-
periments, regardless of their ilk, reveal effects of training on
performance in subsequent similar tasks with different content.
Similarity thus provides the basis for habitual or recollective
influences of training. When faced with an ambiguous burst of
laughter during a speech, for example, a socially anxious person
might remember having had a similar experience in the past during
which she felt humiliated, or she might habitually interpret the
laughter as scorn, with no thought of similar prior events. Quite
possibly, however, some combination of recollection and habit
guides her interpretation. As a first approach to examining the
bases of transfer in CBM-I tasks, our experiments used Jacoby’s
process-dissociation procedure (PDP; Jacoby, 1991).
Process-dissociation procedures were developed partly in re-
sponse to questions about the “process purity” of performance on
tests of implicit memory (Jacoby, 1991). Because participants are
not instructed to think back to prior experience as they perform on
an implicit memory test, automatic influences of prior experience
had been assumed to guide performance, much as they are as-
sumed to underlay CBM-I effects on transfer performance, al-
though, in both cases, recollection could be spontaneously insti-
gated by some noninstructed means. A typical process-dissociation
paradigm utilizes two types of instructions on test trials: one in
which participants are asked to respond with an item encountered
previously and one in which they are asked to try to recall a
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previous instance and respond differently. If they fail to respond
differently in the latter case, against instructions, then the influence
of prior experience might lie outside awareness, as habits often do.
PDP instructions culminate in estimates of automatic and con-
trolled components of memory when the assumption about their
stochastic independence can be met. We provide these estimates;
however, our main interest is in the analogy between task instruc-
tions and ways in which people use prior experience to interpret
current ambiguity. To be consistent with CBM-I phases of training
and transfer, we modified the PDP paradigm by asking participants
to respond in the same way as they had previously responded to a
similar scenario (by choosing between negative and benign com-
pletions of ambiguous test scenarios) or to try to remember a
similar scenario and respond differently. These instructions serve
as experimental analogues to what anxious people might be asked
to do in treatment: to respond to new ambiguous situations in a
manner that is similar to the way they have practiced in therapeutic
contexts, or to respond differently from the way they typically
respond.
We report two experiments performed with CBM-I procedures
modified by PDP instructions at test. The training phase was
designed like prior CBM training phases (see Mackintosh,
Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, & Cook, 2006; Mathews & Mackin-
tosh, 2000). Ambiguous scenarios were each resolved by the
participants’ completion of a fragment of the final word, followed
by the answer to a yes/no question about the scenario (to require
comprehension). For example,
You are going to the nearest store to get one or two items. As you pick
them out two men come in and walk to the checkout. You walk up
behind them and hear one of them is demanding: m-n-y/s-rv-ce
(money/service).
Q: Are the two men trying to rob the store?
The training phase was followed by a critical phase that con-
tained additional training scenarios devised to serve as targets for
the test. Pairs of scenarios were created for the critical and test
phases, with one member to be allocated to the critical phase and
the other to the test. The members of each pair shared a similar
context such that it was possible, when presented with the test
member of the pair, to think back to a similar pair in the critical
phase. Table 1 contains examples. During the critical phase, the
resolution of ambiguity was forced by fragment completion; dur-
ing the test phase, participants were instructed to respond in the
same or a different way, compared to how they had responded to
a similar item encountered during the most recent task.
In the first experiment, for ethical reasons, we recruited students
who scored low on a self-report test of trait anxiety and randomly
assigned them to training conditions that encouraged a negative or
benign interpretation bias or to a control condition in which they
responded to nonambiguous scenarios with little potential for
negative interpretation. Because we were initially unsure about the
number of scenarios we could use without confusing participants,
the test phase contained scenarios corresponding only to negative
resolutions, although the critical phase contained both negative
resolutions and benign fillers to disguise the rule. For the second
experiment, we recruited students who scored high in trait anxiety
and assigned them to either benign training or the control condition
and tested with scenarios corresponding to both negative and
benign resolutions from the critical phase.
At the outset of these experiments, we entertained three possible
outcomes. The common assumption in the CBM literature is that the
trained bias is automatic (see MacLeod et al., 2009; Mathews, 2010),
in which case participants should have a difficult time responding
differently from how they responded during training. It seemed pos-
sible, however, that prior experience during training could affect
recollection of critical scenarios through elaborative focus on out-
comes consistent with training, in which case participants should
more accurately respond in the same way as they had during training.
Indeed, there is some evidence that awareness of the nature of inter-
pretation training mediates transfer (Salemink, van den Hout, &
Kindt, 2007). In the third possible outcome, training might cause
proactive interference in memory for training-incongruent resolu-
tions. A possible real-world analogue exists in the case of nonanxious
individuals protected from remembering specific threatening out-
comes by their prior experience with benign resolutions. The results
of Experiment 1 were consistent with this last possibility.
Experiment 1
Method
Overview and design. All participants were randomly as-
signed to negative or benign training (or to a control condition), in
Table 1
Example Scenarios From the Critical Phase and Corresponding Test Scenarios
Critical phase Test phase
You are flying to Florida with your family for a
holiday in the sun. You notice a man sitting
alone in the row behind you, opening a
package. As the paper is removed you see
something that looks like a: bo-kbo-b.
[bookbomb]
You are going to Spain for a week and
feel excited as the plane takes off. In
the seat beside you is a burly man and
you can’t help noticing a bulge under
his jacket. As the stewardess comes by,
he pulls out a: grenadenewspaper
You have agreed to baby-sit while your neighbor
goes out for the evening. You have put their
daughter to bed but she takes some time to
settle down. An hour later you go in to check
on her and find she is no longer: cr-ing
c-nsc-ous [cryingconscious]
A neighbor asks you to look after her little
girl while she visits a friend in the
hospital. The five year old cries when
her mother leaves but then seems happy
to play alone in your garden. After ten
minutes you go out and she is: gonefine
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which they read potentially negative (physically threatening) sce-
narios and completed a fragment of the last word in each one,
thereby resolving the meaning of the scenario as negative or
benign. Following a pause for brief instructions, they continued
responding to similar scenarios in the critical phase. This phase
contained the analogs to test scenarios; we separated them from
training in order to provide some contextual basis for remembering
during the test. The critical phase consisted of 12 critical scenarios
resolved as negative by all participants, regardless of training, and
nine benign fillers to disguise the rule. (Again, we did not vary the
valence of critical and test scenarios because we were initially
unsure about the number of scenarios we could use without con-
fusing participants.) The test phase followed immediately and
consisted of 12 ambiguous scenarios, each analogous to a critical
scenario and followed by two options for endings. Participants
were instructed to remember back to the previous phase and
respond in a similar or different manner (for six scenarios each).
Mood scales were completed before training and after the test.
Participants. Forty-eight students at Trinity University (24 of
each gender) participated in the experiment for extra credit in their
introductory psychology course. Students completed the trait form
of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch,
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) during class and were subse-
quently selected to participate if their trait scores fell at the median
of 39 or lower (ranging from 23 to 39). They were randomly
assigned to training conditions and to one of four counterbalancing
conditions for the test phase, given the constraint of equal cell sizes
according to gender. Assignment toward the end of the recruitment
period considered the values of the trait scores in an attempt to
balance the three groups (Mnegative  30.8, SD  4.05; Mbenign 
30.9, SD  4.20; Mcontrol  31.6, SD  3.12). The data from six
participants were replaced due to their failures to understand the
instruction for the test (n  3), poor compliance during training
(n  2), or experimenter error (n  1).
Materials. Scenarios for the training phase consisted of 60
training scenarios, 10 irrelevant fillers, and 20 probe scenarios (10
benign and 10 negative). Time to complete the fragments on probe
trials was used to assess the effects of training independently from
transfer. The critical phase employed 12 scenarios resolved nega-
tively and 9 fillers with benign endings; 12 test scenarios each
corresponded in context to a critical negative scenario.
Training phase. The 60 ambiguous training scenarios in the
negative and benign conditions were based on those used by
Mackintosh et al. (2006). They described situations containing the
potential for threat to one’s safety or health. On average, they
occupied three lines of text, with the last word presented in
fragmented form. Each fragmented word had only one possible
solution, and it disambiguated the text in either a negative or
benign manner—for example, You are getting ready to go out and
look at yourself in the mirror. You notice a brown mark on your
face that you do not remember seeing before. It is very small and
you realize it may actually be: m-lign-nt/at-rac-ive (malignant/
attractive). Each scenario was followed by a simple comprehen-
sion question, the answer to which validated the correct interpre-
tation of the scenario (e.g., Do you think that the brown mark could
be dangerous?).
Of the 20 ambiguous probe scenarios, 10 led to fragments that
resolved in the negative direction and 10 in the benign direction,
regardless of training condition; they were identical in the two
conditions. Used to help conceal the training manipulation,
nonambiguous fillers were low in emotional content. All materials
were presented in 10 fixed blocks, each containing six training
scenarios, two probe scenarios, and one filler. The order within
blocks was randomized anew for each participant.
To expose participants in the control condition to the process of
reading scenarios and responding to the fragments, we presented
them with 40 nonambiguous scenarios in a random order—for
example, You begin reading a book that you recently found around
your house. One afternoon you are reading it while sitting in your
recliner. You start to feel hungry so you put the book: d-wn.
Critical phase. Twelve critical scenarios served as the to-be-
remembered target events during the test phase. Their ambiguity
with respect to physical threat was always resolved through com-
pletion of a fragment for a negative word. The nine filler scenarios,
included to obscure the fact of negative resolutions for critical
scenarios, were also ambiguous but resolved in the benign direc-
tion. Questions were not used in this phase out of concern that they
might incur ceiling levels of recollection. These scenarios were
assigned to one of three blocks, each containing four negative and
three benign scenarios. Block order was fixed and scenario order
randomized within blocks.
Test phase. Each of the 12 ambiguous test scenarios was
similar in content to one of the critical scenarios (examples in
Table 1). Each was followed by a screen displaying two possible
completions—one negative and one benign—arranged horizon-
tally. The negative alternatives never replicated the fragmented
words from the corresponding critical items, although they in-
voked the same resolution of ambiguity. Scenarios were presented
in three randomized blocks of four each; block membership was
held constant across the critical and test phases. The four scenarios
in each test block varied according to whether the negative word
was presented on the left or the right and whether the scenario was
presented in green font for same or red font for different instruc-
tions (one of each combination within each block). These values
were rotated across materials, producing the four counterbalancing
conditions.
Mood forms. To collect mood ratings, we used visual ana-
logue scales (VAS: depressed to happy, tense to relaxed, pessi-
mistic to optimistic, distressed to not distressed). Each scale was
presented as a horizontal line labeled at each end; participants
drew a vertical line to indicate their current mood. The scales were
each scored from 1–100 (1  depressed, tense, pessimistic, dis-
tressed; 100  happy, relaxed, optimistic, not distressed).
Procedure. Following informed consent, the participants
rated their current mood on the VAS. Each phase of the CBM
session began with instructions and two practice examples. In the
training phase, we instructed participants to imagine themselves in
the situation described in each scenario and to anticipate its final
word and press the space bar to reveal the fragment. They typed
the word and clicked an arrow labeled “next” to reveal the ques-
tion, to which they responded by pressing the “y” key (for yes) or
the “n” key (for no).
After completing 90 training scenarios, the participants turned
away from the monitor while the experimenter initiated the critical
phase. Participants were told that a much shorter set of scenarios
would be presented next, this time without questions, and they
should read carefully because this was an important part of the
experiment. Test scenarios immediately followed a similar instruc-
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tional interlude after the critical phase. We told participants that
each test scenario was similar in content to one of the scenarios
from the previous phase and the way they should respond to these
scenarios depended on both the way they had responded to the
similar scenario and the color of the font in which the text was
presented. If it was green, they should respond in the same way as
previously; if red, they should respond differently. After reading
each scenario, participants pressed the spacebar to reveal the two
alternatives for completion (negative and benign). To choose the
word on the left, participants pressed the “v” key and to choose the
word on the right they pressed the “b” key, each marked with red
dots. Following the test phase, participants rated their current
mood again.
Results and Discussion
First, we present the results in terms of the proportion of
negative choices on both same and different trials. Then we use
these proportions to estimate automatic and recollective compo-
nents of transfer performance. The significant level was set at .05
for all analyses in this report.
Proportion of negative resolutions. Proportions of negative
resolutions chosen at test were submitted to a mixed-design anal-
ysis of variance (ANOVA), with a between-subjects factor for
training (negative, benign, control) and a within-subjects factor for
instruction at test (same, different). Means are presented in Table
2. Revealing that the instructions were effective in the context of
CBM-I, the main effect of instruction was significant and large,
F(1, 45)  84.57, MSE  .056, p  .001, p2  .65. More
important, the interaction was also significant, F(2, 45)  10.53,
p  .001, p2  .32, and followed by tests of simple main effects
within each instruction.
Same trials. The three training groups differed when partic-
ipants were asked to respond in the same way as they had to a
previous, critical scenario, F(2, 45) 5.79, MSE .048, p .006,
p
2  .20. Negatively trained participants correctly chose more
negative outcomes than did controls, but not significantly so, p 
.23; those with benign interpretation training chose significantly
fewer than controls, p .037, 95% CI [.32,.01]. Thus, benign
training established proactive interference in memory for negative
outcomes.
Different trials. The three training groups also differed when
participants were asked to remember a corresponding scenario and
respond differently, F(2, 45) 6.31, MSE .050, p .004, p2 
.22. Again, there was a nonsignificant difference between nega-
tively trained and control conditions, p  .360, but compared to
controls, those with benign training were less successful at avoid-
ing the previous resolution of ambiguity, p  .016, 95% CI
[.357, .039]. The relative failure to respond differently can
result from a strong habit to endorse negative outcomes, but benign
training or low trait anxiety does not establish such a habit. We
therefore suggest that the source of this difference again lies in
memory for the prior outcome.
Estimates of recollection and automaticity. The results just
reported should not be interpreted as reflecting unitary cognitive
processes. In addressing issues of the process purity of perfor-
mance on implicit tests of memory, Jacoby (1991) assumed that
recollective and automatic uses of prior experience make indepen-
dent contributions to performance on any test. If the independence
assumption can be made in Experiment 1, on same trials, partici-
pants completed the test scenarios by choosing negative outcomes
because they recollect the previous outcome (R) or because, in the
absence of such recollection, habit guided the choice [(1R)H];
the probability of correctly responding on same trials is therefore
R  (1R)H. On different trials, participants responded errone-
ously with negative outcomes when, in the absence of recollection,
habit guided the choice [(1R)H]. To obtain estimates of R, the
proportion of different trials on which negative outcomes are
erroneously chosen are subtracted from the proportion of same
trials on which negative outcomes are correctly chosen. Estimates
of H are obtained by substitution. Estimates of R and H can then
be examined for effects of cognitive bias modification.
We present the analysis of these estimates even though we
cannot verify the assumption that recollection and habit operate
similarly in response to the two instructions. This assumption is
typically validated by examining performance on test items that
are new to the participants (and counterbalanced with “old” test
items across participants). In the CBM-I paradigm, new test trials
are difficult and perhaps impossible to invent, due to the great
degree of similarity among training items and the fact that old
items are actually never used at test because the test is a transfer
test containing all new items. “New” test scenarios would have to
be dissimilar to all training and critical items yet contain the
possibility for a negative resolution of ambiguity. Lacking such
items, we cannot evaluate the assumptions necessary for process
estimates, and so we present the analyses merely as possibilities to
be considered.
Estimates of controlled recollection. To paraphrase Jacoby
(1991) for our purposes, controlled, recollective use of prior ex-
perience can be conceived in terms of both successfully respond-
ing in the same way as previously and successfully avoiding the
prior response when it is undesirable. Estimates were obtained by
subtracting the proportion of negative choices on different trials
from the proportion of negative choices on same trials. The anal-
ysis of these estimates corresponds exactly to the test of the
interaction of training condition with instruction, reported previ-
ously. Mean estimates are shown in Figure 1. Compared to the
control condition, negative training did not improve recollection,
but benign training impaired it, p  .004, 95% CI [.61, .13].
Estimates of habit. Habit estimates were obtained by dividing
the proportion of negative choices under instructions to respond
differently by (1–R). This operation produced indeterminate re-
sults for four participants in the negative training condition be-
cause recollection was at ceiling; therefore, the mean estimate in
this condition is potentially misleading (M  .27, SD  .267).
Nevertheless, the differences among the three training conditions
were nonsignificant, F(2, 41)  1.44, MSE  .086, p  .248,
p
2  .07 (Mcontrol  .44, SD  .330; Mbenign  .44, SD  .271).
Table 2
Experiment 1: Mean Proportion of Negative Resolutions of
Ambiguity During Test (Standard Deviation)
Training condition Same instruction Different instruction
Negative .79 (.206) .11 (.208)
Benign .53 (.229) .39 (.296)
Control .70 (.221) .19 (.134)
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No evidence for a trained habit was found; however, this outcome
should be considered quite cautiously, because assumptions could
not be validated in this instantiation of PDP.
Measures during training. Time to complete the fragments
on probe trials served as an independent measure of transfer.
Latencies in ms were measured from the key press that revealed
the fragment to the striking of the first key of the response. Mean
latencies were submitted to a mixed-design ANOVA, with the data
from four participants missing due to experimental error (three in
the negative and one in the benign condition). The design included
a between-subjects factor for training and within-subjects factors
for valence and half (first vs. second half of the 10 negative and 10
benign probe trials). The analysis revealed a marginally significant
interaction of training and valence, F(1, 26)  4.09, MSE 
239521, p  .054, p2  .14. Negatively trained participants re-
sponded similarly to negative and benign probes (Mnegative  1632,
Mbenign  1622), but those in the benign condition responded more
slowly to negative probes (Mnegative  1993, Mbenign  1608).1
Finally, along with the main effect of valence and the main effect of
half, the interaction of valence with half was significant, F(1, 26) 
9.43, MSE 181627, p .005, p2 .27. Across training conditions,
these nonanxious participants responded more slowly to negative than
benign resolutions in the first half (Mnegative  2267, Mbenign 
1822), but the difference disappeared during the second half
(Mnegative  1357, Mbenign  1408). Taken together, these results
indicate that CBM was somewhat successful.
The number of correctly answered questions on probe trials
served as a check for compliance in reading the scenarios. As
might be expected from nonanxious participants, a larger propor-
tion of questions were answered correctly on benign probe trials
during training than on negative probe trials, F(1, 30)  5.83,
MSE  .015, p  .022, p2  .16 (Mbenign  .90, Mnegative  .83).
Yet, this difference did not depend on training, and there was no
overall difference according to training, p  .58.
Mood change. Separate mixed-design ANOVAs were con-
ducted for each of the mood scales, with time of measurement as the
within-subjects factor and training condition as the between-subjects
factor. The pessimistic/optimistic scale was the only one to produce
significant differences; all other p values .383. Participants became
more pessimistic as a result of experimental events, F(1, 45)  4.21,
MSE 111.21, p .046, p2 .09 (MTime 1 75, MTime 2 70). In
addition, the analysis revealed a nonsignificant trend for an interaction
of time with training condition, F(2, 45) 2.73, p .076, p2 .11.
The increase in pessimism found in the other conditions was absent in
the benign condition, but participants in this condition began the
session in a more pessimistic frame of mind (MTime 1 66, MTime 2
69) compared to those in the negative condition (MTime 1  75,
MTime 2 67) and control condition (MTime 1 82, MTime 2 74). In
short, we found little evidence of change in mood state as a function
of our procedures.
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 encouraged us to perform a second
experiment in order to replicate the proactive interference effect
with anxious individuals, for whom benign training has been
successful in previous experiments (see Mathews, 2010). In addi-
tion, we had planned from the outset to include benign test trials in
a second experiment after exploring the levels of performance
obtained with 12 test trials in Experiment 1. The issue concerned
whether participants could remember specific content after having
read so many scenarios during training. In that regard, responsive-
ness to instructions as well as end-of-session interviews indicated
that participants subjectively experienced recall of the relevant
critical scenarios. Therefore, we added new scenarios to the critical
and test phases in Experiment 2. Finally, the method of instructing
participants about how to respond on the test was changed to a
one-word verbal display (same or different) presented just before
the alternatives.
Method
Participants and design. Forty introductory psychology and
introductory neuroscience students at Trinity University (20 of
each gender) participated in the experiment for credit in their
courses. Students completed the trait version of the STAI and were
selected to participate if they produced scores above the median of
39. (Actual scores ranged from 43 to 68; Mbenign  50.6, SD 
5.71; Mcontrol  50.1, SD  6.0). With the constraint of equal cell
sizes, participants were randomly assigned to receive either benign
or control training and to one of four counterbalancing conditions
for rotating instructions and position across items on the test.
Materials and procedure. As in Experiment 1, participants
in the benign condition read 90 scenarios in the training phase (60
training, 10 fillers, and 20 probes). Those in the control condition
read a total of 70 scenarios organized in 10 blocks of seven (five
nonambiguous scenarios plus one negative and one positive probe
scenario). Half of the 24 scenarios in the critical phase ended with
negative resolutions and half with benign. Seven new scenarios
were added to those used in Experiment 1, four were deleted, and
others were slightly modified. The resolution of ambiguity in each
1 The simple interaction of training condition with valence was signifi-
cant in the second half, F(1, 26)  5.38, MSE  83763, p  .029, p2 
.17, but the pattern did not significantly differ from the first half.
Figure 1. Mean estimates of recollection in each training condition in
Experiment 1. Error bars represent one standard error.
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scenario was reversed from Experiment 1. Scenarios were pre-
sented in three randomized blocks of eight scenarios each (four
negative and four benign). The test phase was composed of 24
scenarios corresponding to those presented in the critical phase and
was organized according to the same randomized-block design,
preserving the same block position as the paired scenarios from the
critical phase. Within blocks, the four of each resolution type
represented the combinations of position (negative resolution on
left or right) and instruction (same or different). Test scenarios
were presented in black letters. A new screen with the centered
instruction SAME or DIFFERENT appeared for 1500 ms after the
participant had read the scenario and pressed the spacebar; this
instruction preceded the presentation of the two alternative reso-
lutions of ambiguity.
After the second mood scale (following the test), we showed
short clips from the film What Lies Beneath (Zemeckis, Starkey, &
Rapke, 2000). The scenes involved an apprehensive woman
watching her front door open by itself, her bathtub mysteriously
fill with water, and writing appear on her foggy bathroom mirror.
A third set of mood scales followed the clips. This was our attempt
to utilize a stressor that might be capable of revealing differences
in emotional reactions as a function of training (see Wilson,
MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006). In all other respects, the
materials and procedures were the same as those used in Experi-
ment 1.
Results and Discussion
Proportion of negative and benign resolutions. Proportions
of test choices that conformed to the resolution forced during the
critical phase were submitted to a mixed-design ANOVA, with a
between-subjects factor for training (benign, control) and within-
subjects factors for instruction at test (same, different) and valence
of the critical resolution (negative, benign). Means are presented in
Table 3. The three-way interaction was significant, F(1, 38) 
9.87, MSE  .030, p  .003, p2  .21. (The main effect of
instruction was also significant, p  .001.) Follow-up tests of
simple interactions within each instruction are described next.
Same trials. The proportion of test choices that conformed to
the resolution forced during the critical phase depended on the
interaction of training and resolution valence, F(1, 38)  6.64,
MSE  .035, p  .014, p2  .15. Replicating the effect in
Experiment 1, benign training decreased the proportion of correct
negative resolutions, t(38)  2.26, SE  .063, p  .029, 95% CI
[.27, .02]. A nonsignificant benefit of benign training was
found in the correct production of benign resolutions, p  .194;
however, benign training produced more correct benign than neg-
ative resolutions, t(19)  3.94, SE  .044, p  .001, 95% CI [.08,
.27].
Different trials. The simple interaction of training and va-
lence was not significant, p  .118. An a priori test of the training
difference in avoiding negative items (found in Experiment 1) was
also nonsignificant, p  .180, although the difference was in the
direction of replication. The lack of replication might reflect
changes in procedure or levels of anxiety. More important to our
conclusions, however, is the fact that in neither experiment did we
find a pattern of avoidance on different trials that would suggest
training-congruent habit.
Estimates of recollection and habit. Estimates were submit-
ted separately to a mixed-design ANOVA with a between-subjects
factor for training condition and a within-subjects factor for va-
lence of the resolution in the critical phase. Estimates of habit did
not differ significantly according to training for either type of
resolution during the critical phase. As illustrated in Figure 2,
estimates of recollection produced a significant interaction, F(1,
38)  9.96, MSE  .059, p  .003, p2  .21. Compared to the
control condition, benign training impaired recollection of nega-
tive resolutions, t(38)  2.46, SE  0.095, p  .019, 95% CI
[.43, .04], but failed to improve recollection of benign out-
comes, p  .293. Anxious participants in the control condition
tended to recollect negative resolutions better than benign, al-
though the difference was nonsignificant, p  .113. Those in the
benign condition clearly recollected benign outcomes better than
negative ones, t(19)  3.00, SE  0.067, p  .007, 95% CI [.06,
.34]. Thus, the interference effect of benign training for negative
outcomes found in Experiment 1 was replicated in a sample of
anxious students. Anxious students in the control group showed an
untrained tendency to recollect negative better than benign out-
comes, and this difference was reversed by benign training.
Measures during training. Because critical trials with both
outcomes were included in this experiment, we could assess train-
ing by examining performance in the critical phase, following the
completion of the main training phase. This method was preferred,
given the smaller number of probe trials during the main training
phase and the reasoning that differences should be more likely
found following a greater number of training trials. Latencies in ms
to begin typing final words during the critical phase were submit-
ted to a mixed-design ANOVA, with a between-subjects factor for
training and a within-subjects factor for valence. The analysis
revealed a significant interaction, F(1, 38) 4.45, MSE 64,862,
p  .042, p2  .12. Benign-trained participants responded more
slowly on negative trials (Mnegative 1759, Mbenign 1606), t(19)
2.26, SE  67.71, p  .036, 95% CI [10.9, 294.4]. Controls did not
differentiate, p  .350 (Mnegative  1610, Mbenign  1697).
Change in mood and reactions to stressor. There were no
significant training-related differences in mood ratings from the
first to the second measurement. To investigate the possibility that
CBM affected reactions to our film, we also analyzed changes
from the second to the third measurement times (see Wilson et al.,
2006). None of these analyses revealed significant interactions,
p  .50. However, all participants reported more distress, pessi-
mism, and tension after watching the clips. Changes varied from 5
points on the scale (pessimistic, Msecond  .56, Mthird  .49, p 
.006, p2  .18) to 20 points (tense, Msecond  .52, Mthird  .32,
p  .001, p2  .49). Either our choice of an appropriate stressor
Table 3
Experiment 2: Mean Proportion of Negative and Benign
Resolutions of Ambiguity During Test (Standard Deviation)
Resolution valence Same instruction Different instruction
Negative resolutions
Benign training .61 (.197) .33 (.226)
Control .75 (.199) .23 (.198)
Benign resolutions
Benign training .78 (.109) .30 (.192)
Control .71 (.229) .33 (.202)
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was insufficiently ambiguous, sufficient power was lacking to
detect a small effect, or CBM did not ameliorate emotional reac-
tions.
General Discussion
A large number of CBM-I experiments have successfully sim-
ulated anxiety-related interpretation biases by guiding the resolu-
tion of many ambiguous situations toward threatening conclusions
and observing negative interpretations of subsequent ambiguous
situations. As precursors to therapeutic interventions, successful
change in the opposite direction has also been found, even in
anxiety-disordered samples (e.g., Beard & Amir, 2008). The re-
sults from our experiments, designed to explore the bases of such
transfer of training, suggest that one mechanism is impaired mem-
ory for negative resolutions brought about by benign training.
When asked to respond similarly to how they had previously
responded, nonanxious (Experiment 1) and anxious (Experiment
2) students in the benign training condition chose fewer negative
resolutions when it was appropriate to do so. Unlike anxious
controls, the anxious students with benign training also correctly
chose more benign than negative resolutions, although they did not
correctly choose more benign resolutions than did controls.
Performance following instruction to resolve in line with previ-
ous experience should not be assumed to reflect a unitary process:
It can be affected by both habitual and controlled effects of that
prior experience. For that reason, independence equations were
used to separately estimate each component, even though the
underlying assumptions for interpreting the equations could not be
assured. Another way to view the estimates of recollection, how-
ever, is to realize that students who produced low estimates were
less successful in both the intentional use and the intentional
avoidance of the resolutions constrained at the end of training in
Experiment 1. In this sense, controlled recollection of negative
outcomes was impaired by benign training. Pursuit of this finding,
whether expressed in terms of performance measures or process
estimates, might lead us to design effective cognitive vaccines for
anxious people (see Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009, for such a
vaccine for depression).
Neither experiment produced evidence that habitual responding
during transfer was affected by training. Although habit can log-
ically contribute to correct responding on same trials, no evidence
of training congruent performance was obtained on those trials.
Moreover, when participants were instructed to respond differ-
ently, training-congruent errors were not observed. Instead, non-
anxious students with benign training, compared to controls, un-
intentionally responded in a training-incongruent manner on
different trials. (The same pattern, although nonsignificant, was
also observed for anxious students.) Responding in the same
manner when instructed to do the opposite can result both from a
strong habit to respond that way (clearly not true of these partic-
ipants) and from faulty memory for the outcome of the prior
analogue. In the case of our participants with benign training, the
latter source is consistent with their deficient performance when
asked to respond in the same way.
One reasonable explanation for the lack of habit-related effects
of CBM-I in these experiments is a lack of power. Many more
training trials might be needed to show changes at the automatic
level. The combination of our training and critical phases consisted
of approximately the same number of training trials as other CBM
experiments focused on scenario-based interpretation training
(e.g., excluding probe trials, 72 negative trials in Experiment 1 and
72 benign trials in Experiment 2, compared to 64 by Mathews &
Mackintosh, 2000, and 80 by Mackintosh et al., 2006), although
not as many as might be needed to reverse biases found in anxious
populations. Thus, we advise against conclusions that habit is not
trained in CBM-I, and we do so for yet another reason.
For the lack of habit-related effects in these experiments to be
relevant to the interpretation of CBM-I outcomes in other exper-
iments, we would need to be certain that the automatic component
of transfer invoked by our PDP instructions is the same automatic
component that operates without any instruction to think back to
the prior phase during the transfer task, as is typical in CBM-I
experiments. In other words, habit might operate differently under
implicit instructions than under PDP instructions. (See Jacoby,
1991, for a discussion of these issues.) Nevertheless, automatic
influences of prior experience are certainly what therapists wish to
oppose when they encourage clients to think about their prior
behavior and respond differently. Because the notion of opposing
habit has ecological validity, the absence of a training congruent
pattern on different trials is notable. Pursuit of this issue with a
greater amount of training is an important direction for future
CBM research.
In spite of the lack of habit-related effects in our experiments,
however, the general implication of our main finding of proactive
interference in memory for negative resolutions is oddly synchro-
nous with what would be implied by a change in habit. If we
cannot change habits for the better, we can at least impair the
ability to remember negative events. A recent meta-analysis found
substantial evidence for selective recall of negative material by
anxious individuals (Mitte, 2008). Even the anxious controls in
Experiment 2 tended to recollect negative outcomes at higher
Figure 2. Mean estimates of recollection for scenarios that were resolved
in negative or benign directions by participants who had been trained in the
benign and control conditions in Experiment 2. Error bars represent one
standard error.
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levels than benign outcomes. Another important direction for
CBM research, therefore, is to determine whether recollection of
negative events prolongs or exacerbates anxiety disorders. If so,
impairing recollection of negative resolutions might indeed be a
worthwhile venture.
Although the results from our performance measures can be
interpreted in straightforward ways, our findings expressed in
terms of estimates of controlled and automatic processes stand on
less firm ground. One limitation concerns the legitimacy of the
assumption that habit and recollection make independent contri-
butions to the resolution of ambiguity. Another possible assump-
tion about these processes in the context of CBM-I is akin to the
generate/recognize model of performance on a variety of memory
tasks (see Jacoby, 1996). This model would be appropriate if
resolutions of the test scenarios come to mind automatically and
subsequently are checked for “recognition” of whether they cor-
respond to the appropriate critical scenarios, following an evalu-
ation of the instructions to respond similarly or differently. Ac-
cording to this model, the proportion of resolutions correctly
generated under same instructions is a process-pure estimate of
habit (or the probability of generation). In that regard, what we
found in Experiment 2 was that benign training decreased the habit
to respond in the same way to analogues of previous negative
outcomes. As such, the message is similar to our current report of
impairment. Whether by habit or recollection, training seems to
impair the use of training-incongruent analogues instead of im-
proving the use of training congruent analogues. The generate/
recognize model does not provide an intuitive fit for our task
because a number of words might complete the scenario, and
therefore an efficient strategy is simply to wait for the options to
be provided on the next screen (permitting the independent con-
tributions of habit and recollection). However, other experimental
tasks could be designed to provide estimates of automatic and
controlled components that are in line with generate/recognize
assumptions or other assumptions about the interaction of auto-
matic and controlled uses of training.2
Yet another account of our results relies on the possible use of
a strategy for choosing responses when the critical analogue can-
not be recalled and participants must therefore guess. In the neg-
ative and benign conditions of training, the best guessing strategy
might be to respond consistently with their training on same trials
and in opposition to training on different trials. This strategy would
produce estimates of recollection that are larger when the resolu-
tion of critical scenarios is congruent with training and smaller
when incongruent with training, compared to estimates in the
control condition. In both experiments, this pattern was found for
incongruent trials but was nonsignificant for congruent trials.
Lacking an explanation for why this guessing strategy would be
restricted to incongruent trials, we suggest that its possible use
cannot fully account for the differences we found. Nevertheless,
evidence of guessing, although difficult to obtain in this paradigm,
should be sought in future research. Guessing biases, whether
strategic or automatic, are logical loci for effects of prior experi-
ence.
Regardless of the model that best characterizes performance in
any particular transfer paradigm, we hope that future CBM-I
research will continue a procedural analysis of transfer, not only
because transfer performance is rarely process pure but also be-
cause it is clear that CBM-I affects performance on tests of
intentional memory (see Hertel & Brozovich, 2010). For these and
other reasons, investigating the contribution of memory processes
to transfer constitutes the sort of direct test of assumptions under-
girding CBM that MacLeod et al. (2009) have recently recom-
mended. Not the least of these reasons is the need to know whether
emotional benefits of CBM-I are resistant to recollective states of
mind, as our findings might suggest.
A final limitation of the experiments we report concerns their
inability to address the effects of negative training on recollection
of benign outcomes. Only Experiment 1 included a negative-
training condition, and it omitted benign outcomes from the testing
procedure. The new tradition of CBM-I experiments began with
the idea of simulating interpretations made by anxious individuals.
Surely it would be important to know whether pseudoanxious
individuals in a negative training condition would have trouble
remembering benign outcomes due to proactively interfering in-
terpretations and, moreover, whether such trouble might contribute
to the development of anxiety disorders in real life and slow the
pace of therapeutic intervention.
2 Proactive interference affected recollection in our experiments; however,
Jacoby, Debner, & Hay (2001) found proactive interference from training on
estimates of habit. Their use of PDP sidestepped the instruction to respond
differently; all tasks involved recall. We call attention to this difference to
illustrate the importance of the particular setting and instructions used in PDP,
as well as to suggest possible directions for future research.
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